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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND WEBB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, WILLIAM 
REAGAN, individually, 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, 
individually, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(Supp. 1989). This appeal is taken from the January 5, 1989 Order by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable James Sawaya presiding, 
granting summary judgment in favor of Roland Webb and dismissing the fourth cause 
of action of defendant R.O.A. General, Inc.'s ("R.O.A.") Counterclaim. The District 
Court's Order was certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The only issue before this Court on appeal is the Third Statement of Issues set 
forth in appellant's ("R.O.A.V) opening brief, i.e., 
Did the trial court err in determining that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to the adequacy of the disclosure made by Webb to the 
board of directors of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising before allegedly taking 
advantage of a corporate opportunity? 
No. 890164-CA 
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R.O.A.'s counsel stipulated to the District Court's Order granting Webb leave to amend 
his reply to R.O.A.'s counterclaim by adding Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 as a specific 
statute of limitations defense to the fourth cause of action of R.O.A.'s Counterclaim. 
(R. 871, 858-860, 851-856, 974-984)7 The issue of whether Section 78-12-27 was the 
applicable statute of limitations and the issue of whether Webb waived his right to rely 
on the applicable statute of limitations were mooted by R.O.A.'s stipulation to Webb's 
amended reply and are therefore not before this court on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Assuming R.O.A. is correct that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 is the only 
applicable statute of limitations defense available to Webb with respect to R.O.A.'s 
corporate opportunity usurpation claim, that code section, Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (which permitted Webb's amended reply pleading Section 78-12-27) 
and Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the determinative authorities on 
appeal. The text of each provision is set forth in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Webb brought this lawsuit against defendants to enforce his statutory right as a 
shareholder of R.O.A. General, Inc. to inspect R.O.A.'s books and records, to recover 
from defendants the statutory penalties and other damages resulting from defendants' 
'Following Judge Sawaya's ruling that R.O.A.'s alleged fourth cause of action was 
barred by any applicable statute of limitations, and in light of R.O.A.'s motion to 
certify the summary judgment as final and appealable under Rule 54(b), Webb moved 
for leave to amend his reply to R.O.A.'s counterclaim to include Section 78-12-27 as a 
specifically pleaded statute of limitations defense. At oral argument on said motion, 
Mr. Fishier, R.O.A.'s counsel, stipulated to the court's entry of an order granting 
Webb's motion. 
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violation of the statute (Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47), and to recover damages from 
R.O.A. for breach of Webb's employment contract with R.O.A. R.O.A. 
counterclaimed against Webb, alleging breach of contract and usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity. This Court previously ruled in favor of Webb on the shareholder issue. 
Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 773 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989). Appellant R.O.A. is 
concurrent with this appeal, appealing the lower court's order in favor of Webb on the 
breach of the employment agreement. 
Webb's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which is the subject of this 
appeal, was directed to the fourth cause of action in R.O.A.'s Counterclaim, alleging 
that in 1977 Webb usurped a corporate opportunity of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising 
("Galaxy"), a corporation acquired by R.O.A. in 1981. The District Court granted 
Webb's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 843-44, 838), concluding in its 
minute entry dated August 30, 1988, (R. 838) that there was no issue of material fact 
that "this cause of action and the facts under which it arose existed and was known by 
the defendant's predecessor in 1977. Either of the statutes discussed would bar it." 
On September 19, 1988, R.O.A. moved the District Court pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to certify the court's order granting Webb's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment as a final appealable order. (R. 841-42) 
On or about January 5, 1989, the District Court issued its formal written order 
of partial summary judgment, dismissing of R.O.A.'s corporate opportunity usurpation 
claim. The court also certified its order of summary judgment as a final appealable 
order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 970-71) 
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Until Galaxy was acquired by R.O.A. in July, 1981, Webb was at all times a 
director of Galaxy. (R. 559) Prior to February, 1977, Galaxy entered into negotiations 
to sell its Idaho division to Cosgriff, Inc. and to sell its Wyoming division to Eldon 
Palmer and Palmer Outdoor Advertising Inc. ("Palmer"). (R. 560-61, 1023 at p. 11, 
571) On or about February 10, 1977, Galaxy's Board of Directors adopted resolutions 
approving sales of its Idaho and Wyoming divisions to Cosgriff and Palmer, 
respectively. (R. 571, 574-75) Prior to the adoption of these resolutions, Webb 
disclosed to the disinterested directors of Galaxy his pending business venture with 
Eldon Palmer, pursuant to which he would have the opportunity to acquire an equity 
interest in the Wyoming assets acquired by Palmer. (R. 571-72, 1023 at p. 35-37) 
Following Webb's disclosure of his participation as an equity partner with Eldon Palmer 
in acquiring the Wyoming division of Galaxy, the directors informed Webb that Galaxy 
had no desire to own, control or manage any interest in Palmer or to assume or 
undertake any further debt obligations with respect to the Wyoming division of Galaxy, 
and that Webb was free to pursue this opportunity to acquire an equity interest in the 
Wyoming division for himself. (R. 1023 at p. 13-15; 571-572; 559-564; 574-579) The 
Wyoming division of Galaxy was sold to Palmer. Webb eventually obtained a 51% 
equity interest in Palmer in exchange for his guarantee of Palmer's acquisition 
indebtedness, as disclosed to the directors of Galaxy. (R. 560-562) 
On or about July 7, 1981, approximately four years after the Webb/Palmer 
transaction, R.O.A. acquired Galaxy. Six years thereafter, in 1987, when Webb brought 
the instant action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, R.O.A. 
counterclaimed against Webb, contending that Webb's acquisition of his equity interest 
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constituted a usurpation of a corporate opportunity, a claim R.O.A, contends it 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is unnecessary to address R.O.A/s arguments that the trial court erred in not 
finding that Webb failed to plead the applicable statute of limitations defense and 
therefore waived his right to assert that defense in his reply to R.O.A/s Counterclaim. 
R.O.A. has, by stipulation, agreed to the entry of an order permitting Webb to amend 
his Answer to R.O.A/s Counterclaim to assert Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 (the section 
R.O.A. claims Webb waived) as a specific affirmative defense. Consequently, the 
arguments raised by R.O.A. in Points I and II of its original brief are moot. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-11.) 
R.O.A. has failed to controvert the fact that Webb fully disclosed to the 
directors of Galaxy his participation as an equity partner in the acquisition of Galaxy's 
Wyoming division sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations 
against Galaxy and any of its successors as to any corporate opportunity usurpation 
claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. R.O.A/s Argument That Webb Waived His Statute of Limitations 
Defense is Moot. 
The fourth cause of action of R.O.A/s Counterclaim alleges that Webb, while an 
officer of Galaxy, violated his fiduciary duty to Galaxy and usurped a corporate 
opportunity by acquiring an interest in Palmer, which interest he ultimately sold at a 
profit. This claim, as pleaded by R.O.A., was based on Webb's status as an officer of 
Galaxy and his alleged violation of his fiduciary duties as an officer. Webb asserted as 
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an affirmative defense to R.O.A. 's claim the statute of limitation defenses undci u i u n 
Code Ann, § 78-12-23 (actions upon obligations in writing), § 78-12-25 (actions upon 
obligations not founded upor * * *• * instruments an J ic t ims for relief not otherwise 
provided by law), and ; - ,,uiHi,.> n*r I *u*-\ * contended in the 
summary judgment proceedings "i t>r corporate HipMiu:irv usurpation c i . : -" 
..:: articulate .. • * - *  . user was i-j„t\ asseneu ag^mst 
him J S a d i r e c t s k O . A :.:: ^.* that Section 78-12-27 (actions against d i r e c t o r and 
that W e b b waived < ^ railing to pi ta i : " ,:>ecifically. R.O.A. makes these same 
se arci.njent* n »•. • l ! v stipulation of R.O.A \ ^ounse'1 «uui In .>rdei of 
- . rt 
Section 78-12-27 as a s tatute ot limitations affirmative defense. 
P O I N T II It is Undisputed m a t "W ebb Disclosed to the (:,i;a\y Directors 1 lis 
Acquisition of An Equity Interest in Palmer . 
I Jtah Cc )dc: i i ii i § 78 1 2 2 1 j: >i < » i i e s i • •• • 
Anions against directors .^ stockholders of a corporatioi i to 
a penalty or lorkvure imposed, or to enforce a liability 
cicated, by law must be brought within three years after the 
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts upon which the 
penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability accrued, (emphasis 
added) 
In cases where breach of a director's fiduciary di it) is alleged, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "the statute begins to i en ft om the time that the complaining party 
discovered the wrongs complained of or when he was apprised of such facts and 
|| umstances with respect thereto as woul . . a persoi. . ; . jjnar\ .ntelligence and 
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prudence upon inquiry." Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co,, 56 Utah 
449, 191 P. 426, 429 (1920)(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has further 
stated: 
A corporation, being once charged with notice 
of the character of a transaction, continues 
to be affected by such notice whatever changes 
may occur in the personnel of its working 
force. " . . . A fortiori, notice to the 
board of directors of a fact, at the time of 
a transaction in regard thereto, is notice to 
the corporation, and no subsequent change of 
directors can require a new notice of such 
fact . . ." 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981) fquoting 3 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, § 801 (rev. perm. ed. 1975)). Based on the 
undisputed record, the District Court correctly concluded that Webb's disclosure of his 
participation in the acquisition of Galaxy's Wyoming division to the directors of Galaxy 
caused the statute of limitations to run against Galaxy as well as its successor, R.O.A. 
The deposition of George Hatch (R. 1023) and the affidavits filed in support of 
Webb's Motion for Summary Judgment establish uncontrovertibly that on or before 
February 10, 1977, more than ten years before R.O.A. filed its counterclaim in this 
action, Webb informed the directors of Galaxy of his opportunity to obtain an equity 
interest in Palmer in connection with the sale of Galaxy's Wyoming division. (R. 1023 
pp. 9-15, 25-26, 34-37); (R. 571); (R. 561-562); (R. 574-575) At that time, the 
disinterested directors of Galaxy declined on behalf of Galaxy to take advantage of that 
opportunity and expressly approved Webb's doing so. (R. 572-575) 
The only evidence submitted by R.O.A. in an attempt to controvert the 
testimony of George Hatch, Blaine Glasmann and Roland Webb in the summary 
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judgment proceedings was the Affidavit of William Reagan (R. 610-11) and the 
Affidavit of Richard B. Paxman. (R. 607-608) The Affidavit of William Reagan not 
only fails to controvert the testimony of George Hatch, Blaine Glasmann and Roland 
Webb that a full disclosure of Webb's transaction with Palmer was made to the Galaxy 
Board of Directors prior to the consummation of the transaction, it actually supports 
Webb's statute of limitations defense. Mr. Reagan states in his Affidavit: 
5. That in June of 1981, after the above-referenced meeting of the 
board of directors [of Orpheum], Mr. Jeff Hatch stated to me that the 
board of directors was advised for the first time, by Robert Glassman 
[sic], son of William Glassman [sic], that he had gained knowledge that 
Mr. Webb had previously obtained 51% of Palmer Advertising in 
Wyoming, surreptitiously. This fact was very disturbing to some of the 
board members of Orpheum, which was 80% stockholder of Galaxy, and 
after learning of his involvement they refused to carry a contract for the 
sale of Galaxy to Reagan under the terms and conditions previously 
agreed upon. 
(R. 611) 
Aside from the fact that Mr. Reagan's testimony is double hearsay, it recounts only the 
alleged reaction of "some of the board members of Orpheum" when the issue in this 
case is Webb's disclosure to board members of Galaxy. Whether or not the board 
members of Orpheum were "disturbed" with Webb's transaction is irrelevant. 
Mr. Reagan's affidavit further demonstrates that Mr. Reagan, by his own admission, 
was aware of Webb's alleged "surreptitious" acquisition of 51% of Palmer as early as 
June of 1981. Consequently, under Jones Mining Co., 191 P. 426 at 429, the statute of 
limitations on any claim assertable by R.O.A. or Mr. Reagan with respect to Webb's 
transaction with Palmer began running in June of 1981. 
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Richard B. Paxman's Affidavit is likewise based on hearsay and deals entirely 
with Orpheum Corporation as opposed to Galaxy matters. In Mr. Paxman's affidavit, 
Mr. Paxman states: 
6. That in the late spring or early summer of 1981, your affiant was 
present at an informal meeting of George Hatch, Jeff Hatch and affiant 
at the KALL Radio Station in Salt Lake City, Utah. At this meeting 
your affiant indicated to the Hatchs his surprise at learning that Roland 
Webb had obtained an interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising. Mr. 
George Hatch made the comment that "Yes, I was quite surprised to 
learn of this myself," and seemed quite put-out by this development. Jeff 
Hatch made no comments concerning George Hatch's statement. 
(R. 608) 
No testimony or other evidence was submitted by Appellants in the summary judgment 
proceedings to dispute the facts on which the District Court concluded that Appellants' 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the District Court correctly concluded that any 
usurpation claim alleged by R.O.A. as a successor in interest to Galaxy is barred by the 
statute of limitations which began to run on or before February 10, 1977. 
DATED this f3** day of October, 1989. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
By / g i ^ ^ M ^ 
Stephen Mnimblin 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-23 
Within six years - Mesne profits of real property -
Instrument in writing — Distribution of criminal proceeds to 
victim. 
Within six years: 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing, except these mentioned 
in Section 78-12-22. 
(3) An action instituted under Section 87-11-12.5 
regarding distribution of criminal proceeds to any victim. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25 
Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not 
founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open 
account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article 
charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, 
labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, 
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced 
at any time within four years after the last charge is made or 
the last payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the 
following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act; 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific 
situations limits the time for action to one year, under 
Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by 
law. 
A-l 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-26 
Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or to real 
property; except that when waste or trespass is committed by 
means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause 
of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal 
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except 
that in all cases where the subject of the action is a domestic 
animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the 
time of the loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the animal 
strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual 
knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable man upon 
inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case does not 
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of 
this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws 
of this state, except where in special cases a different limitation 
is prescribed by the statutes of this state. 
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-
17-3, except that the cause of action does not accrue until the 
aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm 
suffered. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-27 
Action against corporate stockholders or directors. 
Actions against directors or stockholders of a 
corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to 
enforce a liability created, by law must be brought within three 
years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts 
upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability 
accrued, and in case of actions against stockholders of a bank 
pursuant to levy of assessment to collect their statutory liability, 
such actions must be brought within three years after the levy 
of the assessment. 
A-2 
RULE 15ra^ UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES 
Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once 
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading 
is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended 
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
A-3 
